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ABSTRACT 
I show that Eric Winsberg’s principles of model-building given in Science in the Age of 
Computer Simulation are insufficient to argue for the external validation of simulation data in 
cases in which simulation results conflict, and that laboratory experiments have an advantage 
over simulations because conflicting experimental results can be decided between on the basis of 
reproducibility. I also argue that robustness of predictions serves the same function for 
simulations as repeatability does for laboratory experiments in either adjudicating between 
conflicting results or allowing us to say that we do not have sufficient justification to validate the 
results. Finally, I argue for an interpretation of the argument from robustness that appeals to the 
convergence of many well-built and diverse models rather than the more common interpretation 
which appeals to the probability that one of a set of models is likely to be true.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
For hundreds of years, progress in science has been limited to using laboratory 
experiments and field observations as evidence to support various hypotheses. With the advent of 
computer simulations, scientists have gained a powerful new tool for producing data and 
studying phenomena. Computer simulations represent a natural system (called the “target 
system”) with a digital model of that system, called the simulation model. The simulation model 
is constructed to try to find solutions to the differential equations from our best scientific theories 
which describe the behavior of the target system. Computer simulations are becoming more and 
more widespread throughout the sciences, from astrophysics to climatology. Indeed, computer 
simulations are being used by many climatologists to predict climate change on a global scale. 
Data from these simulations often are used to build other models that can make further 
predictions. One example I will focus on later in this paper is a model of what areas in North 
America will be favorable, given the data from climate simulations, for populations of a 
particular species of insect, the pea leafminer. Such a model, in turn, could be used to predict 
how populations of that insect will migrate across North American in future decades. 
The question arises, though, as to whether computer simulations are (or can be) just as 
epistemically powerful as more traditional laboratory experiments. By “epistemic power,” I 
mean the capability or potential of some method of investigation to yield accurate and 
trustworthy information about the subject of the investigation. Many philosophers have recently 
given arguments for why computer simulations can be considered just as epistemically powerful 
as material experiments when certain conditions are met. So, simulations meeting these 
conditions, whatever those conditions turn out to be, can be considered just as trustworthy and 
informative about the systems they are used to investigate as material experiments. Eric 
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Winsberg, in Science in the Age of Computer Simulation, argues that whether or not we accept as 
trustworthy a certain set of experimental or simulation data rests on the arguments that can be 
made for the validation the experiment or simulation. Validation, in the context of computer 
simulations, “is the process of determining whether or not the chosen model is a good enough 
representation of the real-world system for the purposes of the simulation” (Winsberg p. 20). 
Likewise, validating an experiment involves determining whether or not the material system 
being investigated in a laboratory is a good enough representation of similar natural systems 
outside of the laboratory such that we can generalize the conclusions we draw about the behavior 
of the material system in the laboratory to the similar natural systems out in the world. According 
to Winsberg, validating an experiment or simulation requires an argument for whether we are 
justified in accepting its results as accurate.  Because these arguments for validation can be 
weaker or stronger for either simulations or material experiments, there is no inherent difference 
with respect to epistemic power between the two types of investigation. Moreover, Winsberg 
gives a set of criteria, called principles of model-building, which are supposed to serve as the 
guidelines for arguing for the validity of a simulation and its results. These criteria are supposed 
to serve to validate simulation results even if (or perhaps especially when) the relevant data from 
the system being simulated is impossible to get through normal empirical methods because the 
system of interest is too unstable, too distant or even too small. Indeed, part of what motivates 
the use of computer simulations in the sciences is that they provide us with a means to study 
natural phenomena, or at least very detailed models of those phenomena, which cannot be 
produced and studied in a traditional laboratory, such as black holes and violent storms. 
I will argue that Winsberg’s criteria for validating simulations, when certain data from the 
system being simulated are lacking, will fail to allow us to distinguish between the outputs of 
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simulations that meet these criteria but give different results. To do this, I present two climate 
simulation models for which we seem to be able to give strong arguments for their validation. In 
other words, according to Winsberg’s principles of model-building, we should be able to consider 
these two simulations as trustworthy sources of data. I then present a study which shows that 
they actually give drastically conflicting predictions in certain cases, so that Winsberg’s 
principles of model-building end up validating contradictory results. Moreover, I will present one 
criterion for validation which favors laboratory experiments over simulations by helping us 
distinguish between conflicting results in laboratory experiments but not in computer 
simulations. This criterion is reproducibility of results, and the fact that it helps validate 
laboratory experiments but not simulations
1
 suggests that we can be more justified in trusting the 
results of well-conducted laboratory experiments than we can be in trusting the results of well-
built simulations. However, following Wendy Parker in “When Climate Models Agree: the 
Significance of Robust Model Predictions,” I will suggest an addition to Winsberg’s criteria for 
accepting simulation results which serves to put computer simulations back on a methodological 
par with laboratory experiments: robustness of results. Robustness of results, in the context of 
computer simulations, is obtaining similar results from a variety of methodologically 
independent
2
 computer simulations of the same natural phenomenon. In fact, robustness of 
predictions may serve a similar validation function for simulations as reproducibility of results 
serves for laboratory experiments. So ultimately, I wish to save Winsberg’s position for equal 
epistemic power for laboratory experiments and computer simulations by adding another 
                                                 
1 This is not precisely true, since reproducibility of simulation results does enhance the internal validity of a 
computer simulation, that is, our trust that the simulation is functioning as we intend for it to function. However, the 
type of validation Winsberg chiefly concerns himself with is external validation of simulations, which, as described 
above, deals with whether or not we should accept the results of a study as accurate. 
2 By “methodologically independent,” I mean that each of the simulations differ in the modeling techniques they 
employ to represent the target system. A more detailed discussion of robustness is found in Chapter 5. 
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criterion, robustness of results, to Winsberg’s list of criteria for the validation of simulation 
results. 
Naturally, this work may have broader implications in the philosophy of science, 
particularly in regard to the nature of scientific evidence and the relationship between theory and 
evidence. Computer simulations, if a modified version of Winsberg's account is right, allow us to 
gather valid data about a system without having much in the way of physical access to that 
system. Moreover, since theories are used to help construct simulations, theory may play an even 
greater role in data collection than previously thought. However, I will be in a better position to 
explain the implications of this paper for philosophy of science more broadly after explaining 
Winsberg's argument for the epistemic equivalence of computer simulations compared to more 
traditional means of data collection. So, I will return to the implications of this work for both the 
nature of scientific evidence and the relationship between theory and evidence in the conclusion 
of the paper. 
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Chapter 2. Winsberg’s Model-Building Principles 
 Eric Winsberg repudiates the claim that experiments are “epistemically privileged relative 
to simulations—the claim that they [experiments] ‘have greater potential to make strong 
inferences back to the world’” (Winsberg, p. 70). Winsberg argues for his position by suggesting 
that “how trustworthy or reliable an experiment or simulation is depends on the quality of the 
background knowledge and the skill with which it is put to use” in designing and running the 
experiment or simulation (ibid. p. 70). By “trustworthy” and “reliable,” Winsberg means that the 
simulation or experiment in question is validated. Validation here refers to external validity, that 
is, whether the simulation or experiment is appropriately representative of the real-world system 
we want to investigate. External validity, Winsberg claims, is determined by “the character of the 
argument given for the legitimacy of the inference from object [under direct investigation] to 
target [the real-world system we want to know more about] and the character of the background 
knowledge that grounds that argument” (ibid. p. 63, emphasis in original).  In the case of material 
experiments, such arguments require appeals to properly calibrated measuring instruments, 
providing appropriate control cases to rule out alternative explanations, the amount of knowledge 
we already have about how the system being investigated works, etc. Essentially, appealing to 
these sorts of criteria amounts to arguing that the experiment has been conducted using sound 
methodology by the standards of the scientific community and that the system studied in the 
experiment is likely to be appropriately representative of the system we want to learn more 
about.  
 To better understand what Winsberg has in mind regarding arguments for validation of 
results, consider a case in which a researcher wants to know what areas of the cerebral cortex a 
particular thalamic nucleus projects to in macaque monkeys. The researcher might inject an 
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anterograde tracer
3
 into the thalamic nucleus in question in the subject and then, after 
euthanizing the subject, examine its brain to see which parts of the cortex the tracer reached. 
Using tracer chemicals is a tried-and-true technique for determining neural connectivity, so the 
use of that technique helps the researcher argue that her results about are valid. Of course, not all 
brains are equivalent, so the researcher will likely want to perform the study on several animals, 
rather than just one. The use of multiple subjects helps establish the conclusion that whatever 
results are obtained for the test subjects will hold for the general population of subjects. Appeals 
to the use of particular techniques, such as anterograde tracer studies of neural connectivity, and 
general experimental principles, such as using an appropriate number of test subjects, are 
examples of premises used in the arguments that researchers make to establish the validity of 
their studies. 
 Likewise, Winsberg suggests that if computer simulations also have been conducted with 
sound methodology and we can argue that the system being studied (a computer program and 
computer) is appropriately representative of the target system, their results can likewise be 
considered externally validated. Of course, since in both the case of a computer simulation and a 
material experiment an argument is required to validate their results, there is no inherent 
epistemic advantage enjoyed by the results of material experiments or computer simulations. On 
Winsberg’s account, what determines the epistemic power of a study, that is, the ability of the 
study to produce results that we can consider to be accurate, is the strength of the argument for 
that study’s external validity.  For computer simulations, external validation of results comes 
from three factors, each a kind of background knowledge, which Winsberg calls “principles of 
model-building”: 
                                                 
3 An anterograde tracer is a chemical compound that, when injected into neural tissue, will travel away from the 
injection site along the axonal pathways of the affected neural cell bodies towards wherever those axons terminate 
(Bear et al., p. 41-42). 
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 (1) Soundness of theoretical principles that guide building the simulation. 
 (2) Soundness of researcher intuitions regarding the system being studied. 
 (3) Soundness of computational techniques employed by the simulation.  
 (Winsberg p. 64-65) 
It is through appealing to principles such as these that the results of computer simulations are 
validated to the point that they are deemed trustworthy empirical data (Winsberg p. 65).  
The first principle essentially appeals to our confidence in our theoretical understanding 
of the behavior of the system we are trying to simulate. So, the fact that we have great 
confidence that Newtonian mechanics describes the motion and behavior of objects larger than 
the quantum scale moving at speeds much slower than c
4
 adds to our confidence in the results of 
any simulation employing Newtonian mechanics. The second principle appeals to the idea that 
scientists trained in the theories and practical techniques of modern science will have, in general, 
good intuitions about how to model physical systems so as to make the model both 
computationally tractable and a good representation of the system being studied. In other words, 
the rigorous training of scientists will help them determine what sort of idealizations and 
approximations are appropriate to make when building a model to ensure that it appropriately 
represents the system in the ways needed for any given study. This training and the experimental 
know-how it bestows upon researchers are particularly important because there is no simple step-
by-step algorithm for building a model of any given target system (Winsberg p. 30-31).  
An example of a specific technique meant for validating the results of simulations that 
relies upon the training and intuitions of researchers is calibration. Calibration is the process of 
showing “that the relevant output of the simulation matches what is known about the 
                                                 
4 The speed of light in a vacuum, approximately 3.00 x 10
8
 meters per second (Halliday et al., p. A-3). 
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phenomena” (Winsberg p. 22). Typically, this is done by checking to see whether simulations can 
reproduce experimental data. However, the comparison between simulation results and 
experimental data is not as straightforward as one might think. For example, “simulation data 
and experimental data are not always obtained from the same spatial location within a system,” 
so proper calibration “requires the skilled judgment of a good observer...there is no [particular] 
metric of similarity between the different data sets that need to be compared” (Winsberg p. 22). 
In other words, calibration requires a certain degree of intuition on the part of the researcher to 
determine whether or not a given simulation sufficiently reproduces past data to warrant 
increased confidence in its results.  
Regarding the third and final principle of model-building, when we have confidence in 
the computational techniques and tricks used by scientists either to implement a model on a 
computer or to simplify calculations, this also lends confidence to the results of the simulation. 
For example, a frequently used computational technique in fluid dynamics is the inclusion of a 
term called artificial viscosity which helps account for “certain crucial effects that would 
otherwise be lost [in the simulation]...in particular, the dissipation of kinetic energy into heat” 
(Winsberg p. 128). As its name suggests, “artificial viscosity” is not real viscosity that exists in 
the system being simulated—it is a fiction, a fabrication on the part of the researcher. But 
employing this fictional term is a computational technique with a record of past successes in 
making accurate predictions. So, when we use a technique like the inclusion of artificial viscosity 
to help model and study systems we have not simulated before, those past successes contribute to 
our confidence in the simulation results regarding that system. Indeed, the past successes of our 
theoretical principles and of the good intuitions and problem-solving skills of scientists 
contributes to our trust in those principles as well.  
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 However, it is worth pointing out that validating a simulation according to Winsberg is 
not the same as “confirming” it in the sense that what grounds the argument for validation does 
not need to be data from the system being simulated. In other words, when we think of a theory 
being confirmed, or made more likely to be true, it is confirmed by some piece of observational 
evidence from systems in the domain of that theory. For example, Kepler’s laws of planetary 
motion were confirmed by observations of the observed paths of planets through the night sky. 
For simulations, though, we sometimes do not have access to the empirical data that would be 
needed to confirm or disconfirm the simulation model, such as when we want to create models of 
systems that are difficult to observe or interact with, like the inside of stars and turbulent storms. 
Again, part of what is exciting about simulation studies is that they might allow us to learn more 
about such normally inaccessible systems. But that means that we have to rely upon arguments 
that our simulations effectively represent the system we are interested in learning more about. 
Indeed, applying a term like “confirmation” to simulations is somewhat misleading, since 
confirmation involves using  evidence to support belief in the truth of some theory or other 
representational entity, whereas the purpose of validation is figuring out whether an experiment 
or simulation’s results can count as evidence. Of course, when building simulations, one wants to 
use theoretical principles which are well-confirmed by observational evidence and appealing to 
the use of well-confirmed theoretical principles can be used in the argument for validating the 
simulation. However, in most cases, simulations also use outright fictions or falsehoods, such as 
the inclusion of “artificial viscosity” mentioned above, in modeling their target systems. Such 
fictions are not “confirmed” in the sense that they are thought to represent veridically some part 
of a real-world system. Nonetheless, using fictions like artificial viscosity help validate 
simulations in which they are employed by having a record of past success in generating accurate 
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results or data points regarding the behavior of some real-world systems. So, to summarize, 
confirming
5
 a simulation means arguing that the simulation model of the target system is a 
veridical representation of the target system while validating a simulation means arguing that the 
results of the simulation are accurate enough to count as observational evidence or legitimate 
data from a target system for a given purpose. It is important to realize that Winsberg is 
concerned more with the validation of simulations and determining whether they produce 
accurate results and concerned less with determining how veridical the simulation is in 
representing the actual processes at work within the target system that produce certain outcomes. 
 
                                                 
5  Again, it is not clear that any simulation is ever truly “confirmed” in this sense since simulations always employ 
approximations, idealizations and falsehoods in representing their target systems. Of course, some have suggested 
that simulations provide generally veridical or approximately true representations of their target systems, and as 
such could be said to be “confirmed” models of certain systems or phenomena. For a more detailed discussion, see 
Paul Teller’s “Fictions, Fictionalization and Truth in Science.” 
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Chapter 3. Conflicting Results from Well-Built Models 
3.1 Conflicting Results in Climate Modeling 
 One problem regarding Winsberg’s argument for equal epistemic power for computer 
simulations is that appealing to model-building principles may not be enough to decide between 
conflicting simulation results when both simulations are supported by reliable model-building 
principles. Suppose two different simulations are made of the Earth’s atmosphere for the same 
purpose of predicting global climate change via change in mean temperature. Suppose also that 
the results of these simulations drastically conflict in some of their predictions, but both are 
deemed to be built with reliable model-building principles to the extent that we can make equally 
convincing arguments for the external validity of either simulation. In such a case, it seems that 
Winsberg’s principles of model-building allow us to make an argument that we could trust as 
being accurate the conflicting results of both simulations, which would be nonsense. Indeed, it 
seems that just appealing to reliable model-building principles will not be enough to decide in 
favor of one set of results or the other because both simulations have been built with what the 
researchers believe to be good model-building principles. The problem is especially troubling in 
situations in which we are using simulations to make predictions about or measurements of 
properties of systems that would be difficult or practically impossible to directly measure, such 
as convection currents inside stars or turbulent wind flows in storms. In such situations, we may 
not be able to appeal to further empirical evidence to adjudicate between the two because the 
source of the empirical evidence, that is, the inside of a storm or a star, is not easily observable. 
 Cases in which simulations are conducted because the systems we want to study cannot 
be investigated via direct observation or experimentation, are not all that uncommon. Indeed, 
part of the point of Winsberg’s arguments is to provide us with a reason for trusting the output of 
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simulations built with reliable principles when it is practically impossible to conduct a more 
traditional laboratory experiment with a system because it is too large, too complex or too far 
away. Again, though, appeals to model-building principles may not be enough to justify having 
the same degree of confidence in simulation studies of this type as we have in well-conducted 
laboratory research in other domains.  
Consider studies involving climate models, such as the study conducted in 2010 by Anna 
M. Mika and Jonathan A. Newman in which they attempt to project what geographical regions in 
North America will be most environmentally suitable for a certain species of insect called a pea 
leafminer, or Lyriomyza huidobrensis by creating a bioclimatic envelope model for it. A 
bioclimatic envelope model is a kind of species distribution model “in which the current 
geographical distribution of species is related to climatic variables so to enable projections of 
distributions under future climate change scenarios” (Heikkinen et al. p. 751).The motivation for 
this study is that L. huidobrensis is considered to be “an invasive species in North American and 
a serious economic pest on a wide variety of crops,” so being able to predict what regions such 
pests may be able to expand to in the future would be helpful in agricultural planning (Mika and 
Newman p. 213).  Mika and Newman use two different climate models in trying to make their 
prediction. Both are the same sort of climate model, called Atmosphere-Ocean General 
Circulation Models (AOGCM), which, according to Winsberg, are “highly complex computer 
models that are constructed on the basis of both principled science--including fundamental 
partial differential equations from mechanics and thermodynamics--and trial-and-error 
approximations and parameterizations, and everything in between” (p. 107-108). The first 
climate model used is one developed by the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling and 
Analysis, which Mika and Newman shorten to CGCM2, and the Hadley Center climate model, 
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or HadCM3. Both of these simulations are run in two scenarios called A2 and B2 which differ 
with respect to the rate of carbon-dioxide emission into the atmosphere. A2 corresponds to a 
situation with high human population growth and slow development of CO2 emission-reducing 
technologies, projecting a relatively high atmospheric CO2 concentration by 2090-99. B2 
corresponds to a situation with slower human population growth and more advancement and 
implementation of environmental protection technologies, projecting a relatively low 
atmospheric CO2 concentration by 2090-99 (Mika and Newman p. 216). Data from those 
simulations, including minimum and maximum temperature values, precipitation and relative 
humidity, was used in another simulation program, called CLIMEX, to create the bioclimatic 
envelope models for pea leafminers in North and Central America (Mika and Newman p. 216). 
CLIMEX essentially takes data about the current distribution and abundance of a species along 
with the current climate conditions then, using information from climate modeling programs like 
CGCM2 or HadCM3, predicts how that species will be geographically distributed in the future 
(Mika and Newman p. 215). The resulting bioclimatic envelope models for pea leafminers are 
found below in Figure 1. As we can see, CGCM2 and HadCM3 result in strongly conflicting 
predictions. For example, using scenario B2 we can see that CGCM2 projects that the 
southernmost portion of Texas will be “very favorable” for L. huidobrensis by the 2080s while 
HadCM3 predicts that the same region will be “unfavorable” at the same time (Mika and 
Newman p. 219). Both models have a similar conflict regarding the suitability of the 
environment for L. huidobrensis in the Yucatan peninsula as well as in other areas of North and 
Central America. Simply put, it seems that there is far more disagreement than agreement 
between the predictions resulting from CGCM2 and HadCM3.
6
 
                                                 
6 Unless, of course, you count the agreement between them on the unsuitability of Canada and Alaska as 
environments for L. huidobrensis. However, given the general unsuitability of typically cool climates for most 
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Figure 1 Conflicting Bioclimatic Envelope Model Results (Mika and Newman p. 219) 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
insects, such agreement may not be very surprising or interesting. Nonetheless, in accordance with the robustness of 
prediction criterion suggested later, we could certainly be justified in trusting that aspect of CGCM2’s and 
HadCM3’s predictions. 
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3.2 Problems for Winsberg's Model-Building Principles 
 Can we decide between the conflicting results of CGCM2 and HadCM3 on the basis of 
Winsberg’s criteria? Winsberg’s criteria are meant to allow us to validate simulation results, or 
deem them acceptable data, but it appears that we can make a fairly strong case for validation of 
either set of results. Both use what can be considered good model-building principles. For 
example, CGCM2 employs a widely-used computational technique known as “flux adjustment” 
to manually adjust or account for certain parameter values which helps prevent the simulation 
from drifting into an unrealistic depiction of the Earth’s climate. Moreover, deciding how 
specifically to make these flux adjustments required a process of “trial and error” which can be 
described as relying to some extent upon the intuitions of the researchers (Flato et al. p. 454). 
HadCM3, on the other hand, appeals to its increased grid resolution
7
 for the oceanic component 
over its predecessor, HadCM2, which should allow it to make more fine-grained predictions 
(Collins et al. p. 62). HadCM3 also refers to a host of improvements over its predecessor’s 
atmospheric model component, including the introduction of a new radiation scheme, the 
representation of convective momentum transport and a reformulation of treatment of clouds in 
the simulation, just to name a few (Collins et al. p. 62).  We can try to sort out whether the 
individual techniques or principles used in one simulation are more validated than the techniques 
and principles used to build the other, but in many cases that will be very difficult, perhaps even 
practically impossible. As Winsberg points out, “[one] cannot attribute the predictive success or 
failure of a given model to a particular localized component of that model because the 
components of models are strongly coupled to one another and hence interact with one another in 
                                                 
7 Grid resolution in computer simulations is how finely the computer model divides the target system for calculating 
changes in the target system’s behavior. In general, the greater the grid resolution is, the more detailed the simulation 
will be. 
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significant ways” (Winsberg p. 110). To clarify, Winsberg means that the modular8 nature of our 
most complex simulations prohibits us from decisively analyzing how those simulations’ results 
are produced because we cannot track how the hundreds of thousands of numbers are exchanged 
and calculations are carried out between different components of those simulations. By the same 
token, no individual technique or model-building principle of the simulation can be validated 
completely independently because it is only through the conjunction of several such techniques 
and principles that we are able to represent the behavior of a target system with any accuracy 
whatsoever. Also, we cannot wait around for 80 years to see which simulation results end up 
being correct, since the whole point of building the simulations is to know what the climate will 
be like without having to physically measure the state of the climate in 80 years.  
So, the next best thing is comparing the models to past data and seeing which models best 
fit the data. Of course, building a simulation to reproduce past data, or calibrating the simulation, 
is one aspect of the model-building principles that Winsberg argues helps validate simulation 
results, since the ability to reproduce such data give us confidence in both our models and in our 
computational techniques. Problematically, both CGCM2 and HadCM3 have been built in 
accordance with and checked against various sets of climate data, so both can be said to be 
appropriately calibrated to the point that we can be justified in trusting their results (Flato et al. p. 
466; Collins et al. p. 78-79). Certainly, each model might fit slightly differently to the available 
empirical data. For example, one simulation might reproduce very closely the temperature 
changes that have been measured in one region of the globe while another simulation reproduces 
very closely the data from another region. Nonetheless, both simulations do an acceptable 
                                                 
8 A “modular” simulation is one that has different modules, or components, to represent various aspects of the 
phenomenon that the simulation as a whole seeks to represent. For example, a modular climate model might have a 
separate component that accounts for precipitation and another that accounts for wind currents. These modules then 
communicate and share data with each other to produce the final results of the simulation. 
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enough job overall of reproducing past climate data that scientists consider them appropriate 
sources of data to use in studies for which climate projections are needed. So again, it seems like 
appealing to principles of model-building and past successes will not give us an appropriate 
means of distinguishing between the results of different simulations for the same system to tell 
which results are actually externally valid. 
 However, laboratory experiments sometimes give conflicting results as well. If so, then it 
seems that laboratory experiments which conflict in that way are no better off in terms of 
external validation than the simulations just discussed, unless we have a criterion for 
distinguishing between the results of conflicting experiments that is unavailable for conflicting 
simulations (or which does not externally validate the simulation results). My suggestion is that 
reproducibility of results is just such a criterion. 
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Chapter 4. Reproducibility 
 One major difference between our ability to validate the results of simulation and 
material experiment in terms of distinguishing between conflicting results lies in the significance 
of the reproducibility of the results. Here I argue that reproducing the results of a material 
experiment speaks, to a certain extent, for the external validity of the experiment, while repeating 
a simulation and getting similar results does not help externally validate the simulation. The 
reason for this is that when a simulation is run multiple times and shows consistent results, all 
that is demonstrated is that the simulation is functioning correctly, that is, the program is running 
on the computer as it was intended to run. Indeed, a given run of a simulation usually repeats its 
calculations many times, so each data set produced by a simulation is essentially a set of 
reproduced results. Nonetheless, as Winsberg suggests, other arguments are required to establish 
the external validity in such a case, like appealing to the successful history of the techniques 
involved in building the simulation or arguing that the model accurately represents the target 
system in relevant respects. For example, we can run a simulation that predicts global mean 
temperature change multiple times and get similar predictions or data sets each time, but that in 
itself does not give us any reason to believe that the predictions of that simulation are accurate 
other than showing that the prediction at least stays consistent and does not vary randomly.
9
  
After all, the simulation could be using a model that simply misrepresents the climate, but which 
runs just fine when implemented on a computer so that it consistently produces inaccurate 
results.  
 In the case of a material experiment, on the other hand, repeating the experiment and 
getting the same or similar results helps establish to a certain extent that a particular entity or 
                                                 
9 Of course, if multiple runs of the same simulation program making use of the same input data produced very 
dissimilar data sets, that would be a reason to not trust the results as well because the simulation is functioning 
inconsistently. 
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phenomenon has been isolated and exists in the real world as theorized or modeled. The reason is 
that repeatedly measuring or producing some quantity or effect in a laboratory environment 
means that we are, at the very least, manipulating a real-world system and gathering data from it 
in some reliable way. If nothing else, repeating a laboratory experiment and getting similar 
results shows that, for the kind of material system being studied in the laboratory, a certain effect 
is more likely to follow from a certain cause. For example, the repeatability of the famous 
double-slit experiment, in which a light source is shone through a pair of narrow slits which 
causes an interference pattern on a screen beyond the slits, is taken to demonstrate something 
about how light behaves in the world outside of the laboratory. In the case of simulations, 
running a simulation over and over again and amassing a pile of results which all largely fall 
within a certain close range of values only demonstrates the precision of the simulation’s results 
but not necessarily their accuracy with respect to any real-world system or entity. 
 Moreover, reproducibility becomes even more important in establishing the external 
validity of material experiments when we consider the importance of reproducing the results not 
just by the original researchers using their own equipment, but also when other researchers in 
different labs reproduce the results. When other researchers reproduce results generated by a 
different lab, we can take that as evidence that the original result did not come from some 
experimenter error in the original study. Rather, the results are more likely to be describing 
accurately some natural phenomenon, whether they are measurements of some quantity such as 
the elementary charge or the rate of cell division in human embryos. Even when other 
researchers use different equipment or techniques to study the same phenomenon, if those 
different methods yield results in agreement with previously established results, it builds 
confidence that the results obtained are accurate. There are, for example, many ways to measure 
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the elementary charge, e. One traditional way involves Millikan's famous oil-drop experiment, 
while more modern methods make use of single electron tunneling devices that can manipulate 
individual electrons (Millikan 1913, Feltin et al. 2009). When these different methods 
nonetheless produce the same or very similar measurements of e, our confidence in those results 
as accurate measurements of the elementary charge grows.  
 One example of how reproducibility helps establish the external validity of material 
experiments, or rather, how being unable to repeat results is taken as a sign of external invalidity, 
is the controversy surrounding Stanley Pons and Martin Fleischmann’s claim in the late 1980s 
that they had discovered “cold fusion” reactions. Pons and Fleischmann proposed that they had 
observed theoretically unaccounted-for excess heat and nuclear byproducts such as neutrons and 
tritium from electrochemically compressed deuterium in a palladium cathode that suggested that 
a nuclear fusion reaction had occurred at room temperature (Pons and Fleischmann p. 306). 
Given what was known about nuclear fusion at the time, namely that it typically occurs at very 
high temperatures such as those found inside stars, Pons and Fleischmann were presenting what 
could be considered conflicting experimental results. However, their claims came under fire and 
were ultimately rejected by most of the scientific community because most scientists were 
unable to reproduce Pons and Fleischmann’s results. Had scientists been able to consistently 
reproduce the sort of effect described by Pons and Fleischmann, it would have been taken as 
evidence of the existence of a real phenomenon. Of course, we might try to blame the failure of 
replication on the scientists. However, assuming that the scientists attempting to recreate Pons 
and Fleischmann’s results were trained in many of the same experimental techniques and had 
much of the same theoretical background as Pons and Fleischmann and had at least a general 
idea of how the original study was conducted, it seems unlikely that so many should fail to 
21 
 
reproduce the phenomenon if such a phenomenon actually existed. Again, all of this is to say that 
laboratory experiments enjoy increased confidence in their external validity when they are 
repeated with the same or similar results, while computer simulations are not externally validated 
by repeating them and getting the same results. Since the question of whether or not simulations 
are just as epistemically powerful as laboratory experiments lies within the extent to which we 
can validate their results, it seems that laboratory experiments have an advantage over 
simulations in arguing for their external validity because we can decide between conflicting 
experimental results based on the reproducibility of those results.  
 This is not to say that the reproducibility of results will always settle the question of the 
external validity of conflicting results between laboratory experiments. My point, though, is that 
reproducibility of results can help settle questions of external validity for conflicting laboratory 
experiments but not for computer simulations. Two different computer simulations may give 
conflicting results initially, but if we discover that one of those simulation's results cannot be 
reproduced, that does not support inferring that the other simulation is therefore producing 
externally valid results. It only supports the inference that the other simulation, because its 
results are reproducible, is at least a candidate for producing externally valid results. Other 
arguments are required to establish the simulation's external validity by appealing to Winsberg's 
model-building principles. For laboratory experiments, if two similar studies of the same 
phenomenon yield conflicting results, but only one set of results ends up being reproducible (say, 
a consistent measurement of some constant), then we seem justified in thinking that the 
reproducible result is the one that correctly reports facts about the phenomenon in question. Of 
course, there may be cases in which laboratory experiments produce conflicting results 
repeatedly. In such cases, researchers will have to begin making arguments for why their results 
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are externally valid while explaining away the conflicting results, and will be no worse off than 
simulationists in similar positions. So, sometimes material experiments have the problem of 
conflicting results which cannot be decided by appeals to reproducibility. However, these cases 
seem relatively rare. More frequently, as seen in the case of Pons's and Fleischmann's results, 
questions of the external validity of conflicting results in laboratory experiments get decided by a 
difference in the reproducibility of those results. For computer simulations, differences in the 
reproducibility of results may help us decide between conflicting results, but such differences 
will not help us establish the reproducible results of a simulation as externally valid. Remember, 
it is the external validity of simulations, or their ability to be informative about the systems they 
purport to represent, that Winsberg is concerned with. So, the advantage enjoyed by laboratory 
experiments over simulations in our ability to externally validate them threatens Winsberg's case 
for epistemic equivalence between the two methods of investigation. 
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Chapter 5. The Addition of Robustness to Winsberg’s Criteria 
5.1 Defining and Defending Robustness 
While the problem presented with conflicting climate predictions suggests that 
Winsberg’s principles of model-building are insufficient to warrant the same degree of trust in 
simulation results as we might have in the results of well-conducted laboratory experiments, the 
problem also suggests an additional criterion popular with other philosophers of modeling and 
simulation: robustness of results. Robustness of results, as Richad Levins originally describes it 
in “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” occurs when “we attempt to treat the 
same problem with several alternative models each with different simplifications but with a 
common biological assumption. Then, if these models, despite their different assumptions, lead 
to similar results we have what we can call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the details 
of the model” (p. 423). While Levins discussed the concept of robustness in the context of 
mathematical models used in population biology, we can easily apply the idea to computer 
simulations in any area of scientific inquiry. When looking for robust results, we would examine 
the results of a wide range of simulations built with certain common assumptions, say, the central 
theory or equations said to describe the phenomenon we want to study. But these simulations 
should differ in how they are conducted, such as by using similar models but different 
computational algorithms to find solutions to the differential equations or by using different 
simplifying assumptions in creating the model of the phenomenon. For example, perhaps the 
simulations might differ in which aspect of the overall phenomenon we want to study, such as 
emphasizing precipitation over air currents, or vice versa, in studying climate change. Such 
simulations might have more complicated, realistic modules for simulating precipitation or air 
currents at the expense of having more simplified modules of other climatological phenomena. 
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Nonetheless, if these simulations converge on certain results, despite their differing simplifying 
assumptions and methodologies, then according to those who take robustness analysis seriously 
we should have greater confidence in those results. 
Of course, some have objected to the idea of robustness of results as providing any 
additional confirmation of those results. In “A Critical Assessment of Levins’s The Strategy of 
Model Building in Population Biology (1966),” Steven Orzack and Elliot Sober attack the notion 
of robustness as an indicator of truth by criticizing the form of the argument from robustness. 
Orzack and Sober present the argument from robustness in the following form (call it version 1 
or V1): 
“(1) M1 [a model] or M2 or … or Mn is true. 
(2) For each i, Mi implies that some result, R, is true. 
Therefore, 
(3) R is true” (Orzack and Sober p. 538). 
Orzack and Sober criticize this argument on the basis that if we change the first premise of the 
argument to either “we know each of the models is false” or “we do not know that one of the 
models is true,” then the conclusion no longer follows from the premises (Orzack and Sober p. 
538). Essentially, they claim that nothing follows from many agreeing model predictions because 
all of the models could be wrong.  
However, V1 cannot be the best or most charitable interpretation of the argument from 
robustness. As Levins claims regarding drawing conclusions from models, “our truth is the 
intersection of independent lies” (Levins p. 423). All models involve idealizations and 
idealizations are falsehoods, therefore no model can be considered “true” in any straightforward 
sense. So, it is clear on standardization V1 that premise 1 must be false, not that it simply could 
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be false. While the argument as Orzack and Sober present it is valid, they have presented it in 
such a way that guarantees the first premise will come out false, which seems to assume the 
worst of appeals to robustness. 
Wendy Parker also recognizes that Orzack and Sober's formulation of the argument from 
robustness is flawed in the way just mentioned in “When Climate Models Agree: The 
Significance of Robust Model Predictions,” (p. 583-4). So, she constructs a different version of 
the argument that may be more appealing (call it version 2, or V2): 
“(1') It is likely that at least one simulation (or model) in this collection is indicating correctly 
regarding hypothesis H. 
(2') Each of the simulations (or models) in this collection indicates the truth of H. 
Therefore, 
(3') It is likely that H” (Parker p. 584).10 
Notice that (1') accounts for the fact that simulations typically are not, in a straightforward sense, 
true. Recall that in Chapter 2 I pointed out that simulations often incorporate deliberate 
falsehoods, or fictions, that nonetheless have a proven track record of getting the data right and 
producing correct results and predictions. By understanding robustness of results to be about the 
likelihood of a model producing accurate results (rather than being a perfectly accurate 
representation of a phenomenon), we avoid the problem of having the first premise always come 
out false. In avoiding that problem, V2 is superior to V1. 
                                                 
10 Parker uses the somewhat awkward phrasing “indicates correctly” to talk about the results of  a simulation being 
able to serve as evidence indicating the truth of some hypothesis without being committed to the simulation itself 
being a “true” representation of a phenomenon (p. 584). Although Parker does not explicit ly say so, this move may 
be motivated in part by the problems facing the possibility of taking a realist attitude towards the representations of 
phenomena in simulations. After all, these simulations often employ, as mentioned earlier in chapter 2, fictional 
components that correspond to no real processes or entities in the target system being modeled. 
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 Nonetheless, I think V2 is still problematic because it does not capture what I take to be 
the argumentative force of robustness. Consider instead the following interpretation
11
 of the 
robustness argument (call it version 3 or V3): 
(1*) M1 and M2 and … and Mn are all considered well-built models by the scientific community 
which employ a diverse range of methods for representing the target phenomenon. 
(2*) For each n, Mn implies that R is true. 
Therefore, 
(3*) R is more likely to be true (or, increased confidence in R is warranted). 
V3 has several advantages over V1 and V2. V1’s first premise involves a disjunction with 
the assumption that one of the disjuncts (a model) is true. However, if we have that knowledge 
alone, it seems as though the joint implications of the other models (which may or may not be 
true) that R is true would not add to our confidence in R because they could be conceptually ill-
conceived models. In other words, robustness is not really doing any work in V1: the fact that 
one of the models is true means that of course something implied by that specific model will be 
true, so the fact that there are other models (which may not be true) making the same prediction 
should not really increase our confidence in R. V2 makes a similar appeal to “at least one” of a 
set of models or simulations producing a correct result. So, it is unclear what contribution the 
other models, which may or may not be “indicating correctly regarding hypothesis H,” are 
making to our confidence in the shared results of those simulations. The first premise of V3, on 
the other hand, appeals to all of the models under consideration being approved at large by the 
scientific community on the basis of being “well-built” (which could include features like 
general empirical adequacy, appealing to the past history of success of modeling techniques used 
                                                 
11 I credit Wendy Parker’s article “When Climate Models Agree” for inspiring this line of thought, and it meshes 
well with Winsberg's criteria of model-building also. 
27 
 
in constructing the model, etc.). If we have reasonably justified confidence in a set of models, 
and all of those models imply some fact R then it seems like we would be more justified in 
believing R than if we were only to justify belief in R by looking at any individual model. Notice 
that now it is the agreement between models that is really doing the work in justifying belief in 
R, not the fact that we think it is probable that one of a set of models is right and makes a certain 
prediction. I think this interpretation of the argument from robustness better captures why 
scientists might trust robustness as a justification for belief in some prediction or theorem R. It is 
not that belief in R is warranted based on a belief that one of a number of models must be true 
(perhaps in some probabilistic sense that “out of all of these, surely one must be true”), so if all 
of those models agree on a certain R then R must be true. Rather, if a set of models that are 
considered generally reliable or are well-founded all imply that R is true, that gives us a better 
reason to think that R is true than if only one such model implies R is true. 
The question remains, of course, whether the fact that robustness of results itself 
contributes anything to our confidence in those results over and above the individual 
contributions of the models and simulations that generate the results. In other words, we might 
ask whether the fact that a given result is robust has any extra power to boost our confidence in 
those results other than from simple aggregation of our confidence in the simulations which 
produced the results. My answer to the question is that robustness of results contributes an extra 
degree of confidence over the combined confidence we have in the contributing simulations 
proportional to the number of contributing simulations and the degree of difference between 
those simulations. Thus, we can express the extra confidence from robustness in the following  
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way
12
: 
R = N * D 
Where R is the additional confidence from robustness, N is the number of simulations 
contributing to the robustness of the result and D is the subjective assessment of diversity 
between the N simulations. 
This extra degree of confidence aligns nicely with the form of the argument from 
robustness given in V3 because the number of contributing simulations matters, as does the 
degree of difference in methodology between each of the simulations. As diversity of models 
increases, so too does the likelihood that we obtain a robust result decrease, since it becomes 
more and more likely that different methods and models used in the simulations result in greater 
discrepancies in their results. So, a greater number of simulations with greater methodological 
differences nonetheless converging on the same result gives us greater confidence in that result 
because agreement due to mere coincidence becomes less and less likely. Notice also that if the 
diversity of models is zero (there's only one contributing simulation and thus no methodological 
difference to be spoken of), then we get the intuitive result that no additional confidence from 
robustness is warranted. Likewise, running the same simulation over and over again and getting 
the same result will not count as a robust result (and thus cannot generate any increased 
confidence from robustness) either, since there will be no model diversity.  
                                                 
12 This equation is not intended to be a precise mathematical formulation to be filled in with units and other 
specifics. Rather, it is a simple heuristic device for explaining where the additional confidence in a result from 
robustness comes from. Regarding the form the equation takes, I give equal weight to number of involved 
simulations and subjective assessment of diversity in the simulations because the argument from robustness seems to 
rely equally on the number and diversity of simulations producing robust results. For without diversity in 
simplifying assumptions, the appeal to robustness loses its force. And if there is only one simulation, the argument 
cannot be made at all. Moreover, the form cannot be additive, since each simulation cannot have its own unique 
“diversity coefficient” because the sense of diversity important to robustness is a result of the differences between 
the set of simulations involved taken as a whole. 
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Here one might take issue with the robustness criterion by questioning what exactly is 
meant by “getting the same result,” or getting “similar” results. The data sets generated by 
simulations are often large and cumbersome, requiring a fair amount of work to make 
presentable so that meaningful conclusions can be drawn from them.
13
 How then are we to 
determine what counts as two simulations getting “the same” or “similar” results? My suggestion 
is that determining whether there is sufficient agreement between simulation results to qualify 
them as robust results is a matter of judgment by members of the scientific community. Recall 
from Chapter 2 that one of Winsberg's principles of model-building involves the soundness of 
researcher intuitions. I would like to make a similar appeal here and claim that it would be 
unreasonable to require multiple simulations to produce exactly “the same” results in order to 
declare a robust result and that any uncomfortable vagueness resulting from the term “similar” 
results from simulations can be dealt with by appealing to researcher experience and training. 
Clearly, if what is required in order to declare a given result robust is that all of the 
simulation generating the result produce the exact same result to the last significant figure, then 
almost no simulation results will ever be robust. Such an exacting standard would render 
robustness of results a practically useless criterion in determining the external validity of 
simulation studies. Simply appealing to the similarity of results seems to be an undesirable 
solution because it seems too vague since we have no metric of similarity. Moreover, it seems 
unclear how there could even be a metric of similarity that consistently applies to all of the 
diverse disciplines of science. For example, in astrophysics, being in the same order of 
magnitude might be sufficient for robustness because of the great scale involved in studying the 
                                                 
13 For a more detailed discussion of how and why “raw data” from simulations are processed into a form “usable by 
scientists,” see Patrick Suppes's “Models of Data” and Todd Harris's “Data Models and the Acquisition and 
Manipulation of Data” (Harris p. 1510). 
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cosmos, whereas a population biologist might require a greater degree of precision when 
deciding whether the results of several studies are all close enough to warrant declaring a robust 
result.  
The different standards of similarity for different disciplines suggest a natural answer to 
the question of how to determine similarity between simulation results: it is a matter of judgment 
by scientists. If we trust in the training and competence of the scientific community, we can 
appeal to that training and competence as being able to determine when a set of results from 
different simulations are similar enough to declare the results robust. Because of their expertise 
in comparing data sets and interpreting results, researchers are capable of judging the degree of 
similarity required for robustness in the same way that, say, skilled billiard players can judge 
angles and difficulties of shots. Of course, this approach to understanding the degree of similarity 
required for robustness leaves open the possibility of developing a more detailed metric for 
determining similarity of results in the future. Developing such a metric, though, is up to the 
members of the scientific community who are engaged in the different disciplines of the 
sciences. 
5.2 Adding Robustness to Winsberg's Criteria 
Robustness of results, or widespread agreement on a given result amongst the majority of 
our best models and simulation results, needs to be added to Winsberg’s list of criteria for 
validating simulation results. Following Parker, I do not think that robustness alone is sufficient 
as a standard upon which to base our confidence in simulation results. Parker suggests that for 
the current state of climate modeling, we could (and do) have many computer simulations which 
largely agree regarding some results, but which we are not justified in placing our confidence in 
that prediction based upon their agreement (Parker p. 581). One reason robustness by itself is not 
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sufficient to warrant confidence in a set of simulation results is that one could artificially create a 
sense of robustness by creating a number of conceptually very poor simulations which one fine-
tunes or manipulates to agree with a more conceptually well-designed model built in accordance 
with Winsberg’s principles. Certainly, we could have confidence in the results of the 
conceptually well-designed model insofar as it is built in accordance with Winsberg’s principles 
of model-building, but in the situation just described robustness would contribute nothing to our 
confidence in those results because the other simulations are admittedly poorly designed. 
However, if all of the models are in general agreement on a certain result (making it a robust 
result) and all of the models which make that prediction can be said to be built more or less in 
accordance with Winsberg’s principles of model-building, then perhaps we could have just as 
much confidence in those results as we do in the results of well-conducted laboratory 
experiments. Certainly, robustness of predictions is not quite the same thing as repeatability, but 
it might nonetheless serve the same function for externally validating simulation results as 
repeatability does for laboratory experiments. After all, robust results give us confidence in those 
results by showing that the same results can be obtained from a variety of well-built simulations. 
Or, if robustness is lacking because multiple studies are producing conflicting results, then we 
know we do not have sufficient justification for trusting the results of the simulation. Likewise, 
in laboratory experiments, repeating and experiment and reproducing its results indicates that 
some phenomenon that actually exists in nature has been isolated or, if the experiment does not 
yield consistently reproducible results, we know we should not trust the results of the initial 
experiment. Additionally, in the same way that the convergence on a certain result by a diverse 
array of models increases our confidence in that result by indicating that the result is unlikely to 
be an artifact of a particular simulation used to obtain the result, reproducibility of results in 
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laboratory experiments helps rule out that a given result was produced by an error on the part of 
a particular experimenter.  Robustness of results, in other words, is how we make reproducibility 
of results meaningful in computer simulation studies. Running the same simulation program 
again and again and getting the same results boosts our confidence very little in the external 
validity of those results, but as I have argued above, reproducing results with a variety of well-
built models and simulations does support their external validity. 
The problem raised by Mika and Newman’s study for Winsberg’s criteria was that it 
seems we could justify confidence in the results of either bioclimatic envelope model for L. 
huidobrensis based on CGCM2’s or HadCM3’s predictions if we rely only upon Winsberg’s 
criteria. However, by adding the robustness criterion, we can say that neither result is sufficiently 
validated because the predictions do not agree, that is, the results are not robust. Moreover, 
assuming we continue to create bioclimatic envelope models for L. huidobrensis using other 
climate simulations in which we can also justify confidence based on appeals to Winsberg’s 
principles of model-building, if we discover that many of those climate models turn out to create 
agreeing bioclimatic envelope models then we can be justifiably confident in those bioclimatic 
envelope models. So, by combining Winsberg’s principles of model-building and the robustness 
criterion, we are able to produce a stronger set of criteria for externally validating simulation 
results that has the potential to give us just as much justification for trusting simulations as we 
might have for trusting well-conducted and widely reproduced laboratory experiments. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 Winsberg’s point in arguing for equal epistemic power for laboratory experiments and 
computer simulations is that both require arguments for their external validity. I began by 
explaining his criteria for the validation of simulations, the principles of model-building. I then 
showed that his principles of model-building were insufficient to argue for the external validation 
of simulation studies in certain kinds of cases in which simulation results conflict, and that 
laboratory experiments have an advantage over simulations in that conflicting experimental 
results can be decided between on the basis of repeatability. I then suggested that robustness of 
predictions could serve the same function for simulations as repeatability does for laboratory 
experiments in either adjudicating between conflicting results or allowing us to say that we do 
not have sufficient justification to externally validate the results. I also argued for a certain 
interpretation of the argument from robustness that involved appealing to the convergence of 
many well-built and diverse models rather than the more common version which involves 
appealing to the probability that one of a set of models is likely to be true.  My interpretation 
strengthens the case for taking robustness as an additional requirement for the validation of 
simulation results and ultimately supports the idea that computer simulations, under certain 
conditions, can provide us with information about the world that is just as trustworthy as data 
from more traditional laboratory studies. 
Arguing for the epistemic equivalence of computer simulations and laboratory 
experiments may have interesting consequences for how we think about the nature of scientific 
evidence. For much of the history of science, for data to count as evidence in favor of some 
particular hypothetical description of a phenomenon, the data are supposed to come from some 
physical system that falls under the descriptive domain of the hypothesis being tested. But, if the 
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results of computer simulations can count as data in which we can place as much confidence as 
we might place in the results of laboratory experiments or field observations, then it is clear that, 
at least when certain conditions are met, we can get novel information about particular instances 
of natural phenomena without having a great deal of physical access to those instances of 
phenomena. 
Moreover, the ability of computer simulations to generate novel information about real-
world systems complicates the relationship between theory and evidence. According to 
Winsberg's model-building principles, part of what justifies taking the results of computer 
simulations as data about a real-world system is that the simulation is based upon sound 
scientific theory. The typical relationship between theory and evidence is often thought to be that 
one proposes a theory, derives predictions from it, and then designs an experiment to see if those 
predictions are correct. But in the case of computer simulations, one uses theory to create a 
computerized model which then produces results that are themselves taken to be data. No further 
empirical work is necessary to “confirm” the prediction of the theory in these cases; the results of 
the computer simulation are taken to be data regarding the natural system being modeled. 
There are other questions raised by this paper that cannot be properly addressed within its 
scope. For example, the fact that outright fictional components, such as the artificial viscosity 
term mentioned in Chapter 2, can contribute to very successful predictions may be a threat to the 
success-to-truth rule of inference that serves as the cornerstone of the “no miracles” argument for 
scientific realism. Indeed, Winsberg raises this question in the penultimate chapter of Science in 
the Age of Computer Simulation. Another question that remains is what role computer models 
play, or can play, in scientific explanation. That many computer models can employ differing 
simplifying assumptions, yet nonetheless generate robust results, only complicates the matter. 
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Suppose a diverse array of computer models of a phenomenon did generate robust results about 
the behavior of that phenomenon: which model, if any, can be said to explain the behavior of the 
phenomenon? None of them? All of them, but in different ways? Whatever the answers to these 
particular questions turn out to be, the growing popularity of computer simulations across 
various scientific disciplines makes it very likely that continued exploration of computer 
simulations will yield fruitful new directions for answering some of the most central questions in 
the philosophy of science. 
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